This blog post examines, from a biological perspective, whether the altruistic behavior humans exhibit truly stems from nature or is a strategy evolved by the selfish gene for survival.
If angels existed and looked down upon us, how would they perceive us? How could we explain ourselves to them? It is said that one scholar, while exploring what it means to be human, sought precisely the answer to this question. Would humans appear selfish to the angels, or would they be recognized as altruistic beings? The question of whether humans are selfish or altruistic is deeply connected to the question of human nature itself. It is difficult to deny that humans act selfishly to pursue personal gain. Nevertheless, we repeatedly observe altruistic behavior in reality, where individuals help others even at their own expense. For this reason, the contemplation of human selfishness and altruism has persisted as a reflection on human nature, transcending eras and academic disciplines.
In the past, this issue was addressed within the realm of philosophical debates, such as the opposition between the doctrine of innate goodness and the doctrine of innate evil. However, in modern times, attempts to explain selfish and altruistic humans through scientific evidence have steadily continued. Among these, the biological interpretation of selfishness and altruism has garnered significant academic attention for addressing the essence of humans as living beings. The task of contemplating human nature within a biological framework holds great significance as it involves scientifically exploring humanity.
First, it is necessary to examine the key concepts proposed by academia to explain the selfish human and the altruistic human. According to Richard Dawkins’ book “The Selfish Gene,” the agent of evolution and natural selection is not the individual but the gene; living beings are merely ‘survival machines’ designed to preserve and replicate genes. Dawkins viewed not only the physical traits exhibited by individuals but also their mental behaviors as an ‘extended phenotype’ originating from genes, arguing this is the result of being programmed to operate in order to leave more genes within the group. In other words, genes are selfish entities blindly pursuing the goals of replication and preservation; even actions that appear altruistic on the surface may in fact be selfish acts reflecting the interests of genes.
Meanwhile, “The Emergence of Altruistic Humans,” authored by economist Professor Choi Jeong-gyu, is a study grounded in economic game theory that seeks to explain how altruistic humans can emerge within human societies, which are fundamentally considered selfish. In this process, various hypotheses and theories are presented to explain altruistic humans. In particular, arguments that altruistic behavior evolved for one’s own benefit hold considerable persuasive power. Among these, ‘kin selection’ is a concept proposed by British evolutionary biologist William Hamilton. It posits that organisms evolved to exhibit altruistic behavior toward relatives within a kin group sharing common genes. This aligns with Dawkins’ argument in that altruistic behavior does not signify personal loss but rather an act that increases the benefit of the entire shared gene pool. However, kin selection theory has limitations in fully explaining altruistic behavior beyond blood ties.
To address these limitations, the ‘repeated reciprocity hypothesis’ was proposed. This hypothesis explains altruistic behavior as a form of investment, where individuals anticipate long-term benefits returning to themselves through repeated interactions. Yet the Reciprocity Hypothesis also fails to fully explain altruistic behavior in one-time encounters or situations where individuals are unfamiliar with each other, thus not fully elucidating the fundamental origin of altruistic humans.
Contrary to the explanations so far, there is also an argument that the very premise that individuals consider only their own interests has limitations in explaining altruistic behavior. A prime example is the book The Cooperative Species by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis. They argue that societies with many altruistic members have an advantage in survival and prosperity over those without, and thus altruistic individuals were selected at the group level through ‘social preference’. Here, social preference refers to the idea that cooperation among members, countering selfish genes, brings greater benefit to the society as a whole. Bowles and Gintis’ perspective differs from Dawkins’ “Selfish Gene” in that it does not attempt to explain the origin of altruism from the standpoint of individual genes. Instead, it seeks the roots of human altruism within the interrelationships of the group, presenting a new viewpoint.
The approaches examined thus far represent the primary scientific attempts to explain both the selfish and altruistic human. Before delving into the main discussion, it is crucial to remember that none of these approaches is accepted as definitive dogma. The very act of seeking to explore human nature through objective evidence is a meaningful process in itself; there is no clear-cut answer to whether humans are inherently selfish or altruistic. This is also why arguments from both sides are difficult to easily refute. Even Richard Dawkins, often misunderstood as an extreme genetic determinist, cautioned against simplistic interpretations in the preface to his seminal work, The Selfish Gene. He stated that humans are beings capable of overcoming genetic dominance through contraceptive technology and social/cultural institutions. Precisely because this issue lacks clear-cut truths, I believe logical coherence, rather than the accuracy of individual claims, should be the standard for judging validity. Here, coherence refers to a state where the evidence presented for a claim is organically connected and internally consistent.
Based on this perspective, I was able to critically reexamine the biological explanations of the selfish human and the altruistic human. The core point is that the altruistic behavior humans exhibit actually stems from selfishness driven by genes. Furthermore, I would add that this selfishness has evolved not solely in a direction beneficial to genes, but in a direction rational for both the human individual and the genes.
First, I believe the origin of altruistic behavior in humans can be traced to genes. The primordial ancestor of all life, including humans, was what Dawkins termed a ‘self-replicator,’ which today exists within living organisms in the form of DNA. Since humans also trace their origins to such self-replicators, the most fundamental layer of human nature requires attention to genes. Genetic nature is often perceived as physical and primitive, prompting counterarguments that humans are beings endowed with higher mental faculties. It is claimed that humans possess empathy, feeling discomfort when witnessing others in distress and thus engaging in altruistic actions. However, even such empathy-based altruism can be seen as influenced by genes.
To illustrate this, consider the following hypothetical situation. Suppose a very close relative and a very distant relative are both facing similar hardships. If one can only help one person, most individuals are likely to choose to help the close relative. This is because the concept of ‘kinhip’ comes into play. Kinhip can be interpreted as an indicator of genetic similarity. This choice occurs because, from a genetic perspective, acting altruistically toward a high-kin-hip individual is more advantageous than toward a low-kin-hip one. Extending this concept of kinship beyond species boundaries allows for a broader interpretation.
We feel compassion for a puppy abandoned on the street and dedicate effort to protecting abandoned animals. Conversely, we easily kill insects like mosquitoes or flies without significant pangs of conscience. Do humans feel guilt when pulling weeds, or do they exhibit altruistic behavior to protect bacteria or fungi? No. This can be interpreted as stemming from our evolutionary relationship with them—specifically, our kinship is significantly lower compared to mammals. To summarize, empathy capacity is proportional to kinship, and kinship can be understood as genetic similarity. Therefore, empathy capacity itself cannot be considered entirely free from genetic influence.
Second, the perspective that views humans and genes as solely separate and antagonistic entities should be avoided. An individual cannot survive without genes, and genes, existing within the individual, cannot be independent of it. Therefore, coexistence through mutual cooperation and compromise between genes and the individual is more efficient for the survival of both. This parallels the biological fact that specialized, division-of-labor cell clusters are more advanced and efficient for survival than simple cell aggregates. For this reason, genes developed the brain—specifically the cerebrum—to operate the organism, this ‘survival machine,’ more efficiently. They delegated much of their direct control to the brain, positioning themselves for indirect, fundamental intervention.
Consequently, a certain time lag occurs before the gene’s instructions manifest as a phenotype. This creates a gap between the mental activities of humans, explained by the brain, and the phenotype intended by the gene. Whereas in simpler life forms, the gene acted as a ‘parasite’ directly manipulating the individual as its ‘host,’ as life forms became more complex, the boundary between parasite and host gradually blurred. Since the individual is indispensable to the gene, the gene had no choice but to adopt strategies that partially weakened its own dominance. Viewed from this perspective, altruistic behaviors like adoption—which cannot be fully explained by kin selection or the reciprocity hypothesis—can be partially freed from the counterargument that their origins must lie solely outside the gene’s selfishness.
Finally, we must question the selfish motives hidden behind seemingly altruistic actions. “The Cooperative Species” argues that cooperative and altruistic traits were selected because humans evolved within a unique sociocultural environment. However, can this altruism truly be called pure altruism? It may not stem from empathy-driven psychological satisfaction but rather from a preference for traits that benefit the group community to which one belongs. In other words, can we definitively assert that personal interests are entirely absent? Of course, one could counter that if the sole goal is maximizing individual gain, a selfish attitude might be more efficient. However, as the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ model demonstrates, the altruistic path of choosing cooperation yields greater overall group benefit than the selfish path of mutual betrayal. Ultimately, genes likely weighed selfishness and altruism over long periods and concluded that altruism is more rational in the long run, leading to its selection.
After reviewing various materials, I arrived at the view that the coherence of a hypothesis should be the primary criterion for judging its validity. Based on this, I argued that human altruism exists under the influence of genes. Given that our ancestors, the ‘self-replicators,’ remain within us today in the form of genes, human nature originates from genes, and the cases of altruism influenced by relatedness provide evidence supporting this. Furthermore, genes cannot survive without an individual host. Consequently, they have evolved in a direction that blurs the boundary between parasite and host, delegating direct control authority through the existence of the brain. The distance created between genes and phenotypes during this process allowed behaviors seemingly at odds with the nature of selfish genes to emerge in humans. Furthermore, we must also consider the possibility that seemingly altruistic actions may be underpinned by selfish judgments advantageous to the survival of both the group and the individual. Unless a god who created humans exists to directly provide the definitive answer to human nature, the debate surrounding selfish versus altruistic humans will never end. Therefore, what matters is not definitively determining right or wrong, but selecting the explanation with the highest plausibility among various claims and deriving meaningful conclusions from it.
