This blog post examines how the security logic of major powers surrounding the Nuclear Security Summit expands under the banner of international cooperation, identifies the risks and limitations revealed in the process, and considers the repercussions this trend has on smaller nations and the nuclear industry.
The Nuclear Security Summit originated from former U.S. President Barack Obama’s April 5, 2009, speech in Prague, Czech Republic, where he identified “the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists” as the “most immediate and extreme threat” to global security and called for international efforts to more securely manage and protect vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide. This summit involves major nuclear-weapon states, countries with nuclear power plants, and nations possessing nuclear technology. International organizations such as the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also participate, supporting the institutionalization and implementation of the nuclear security agenda, giving it the character of a combined multilateral summit. The Nuclear Security Summit is held every two years as a rule. The first summit took place in Washington, D.C., USA, in April 2010, and the second summit was held in Seoul, South Korea, in March 2012. Subsequent summits followed in The Hague, Netherlands in 2014 and Washington, D.C., USA in 2016. The 2016 summit officially concluded the ‘summit format’. However, this ‘conclusion’ does not mean the nuclear security agenda has disappeared. Rather, it signifies that the commitments and institutional achievements created by the summits are being transferred to other permanent or semi-permanent international cooperation frameworks for continued implementation. Indeed, since 2016, follow-up mechanisms like the Nuclear Security Contact Group (NSCG) have been launched to carry forward the agreements and the “community of practice” established by the Nuclear Security Summits. These efforts aim to provide a “connecting device” to prevent the summit’s achievements from dissipating.
The Second Nuclear Security Summit, held in Seoul, placed at the forefront the agenda items of establishing an international cooperative framework to prevent nuclear terrorism, ensuring the safe management of nuclear materials, and establishing a physical protection system for nuclear material facilities. The Seoul Summit saw participation from 53 countries and 4 international organizations (UN, EU, IAEA, Interpol) participated in the Seoul summit, its scale reflecting the weight of the term ‘nuclear security’. Discussions centered particularly on strengthening international monitoring and interdiction capabilities to prevent the illicit trade of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, materials that could be diverted for nuclear weapons, thereby preempting the illegal manufacture and proliferation of nuclear weapons. This awareness of the issue was not merely a slogan; it was consolidated into a direction that the summit should lead to concrete measures such as ‘minimizing nuclear materials’, ratifying and implementing relevant international conventions, and expanding educational and training infrastructure (e.g., Nuclear Security Education and Training Centers, Centers of Excellence). Furthermore, a consensus emerged that the purpose of the international cooperation system must inevitably expand beyond merely “nuclear weapons” to encompass the “safety and security of nuclear and radioactive materials as a whole.” This is because the terrorist threats faced by nations utilizing nuclear power are multi-layered, including attacks on power plant buildings, threats to spent nuclear fuel storage facilities, and the risk of “dirty bombs” using radioactive materials.
There is no doubt that the issues addressed at the Nuclear Security Summit are tasks the international community must collectively uphold. However, precisely for that reason, questions may arise about whether the large-scale summit format, mobilizing numerous leaders and vast resources, is truly the most cost-effective approach. The goal of nuclear security carries a moral justification that few would openly oppose. Consequently, the summit often resembles a “slogan chanting” event, primarily serving to repeatedly affirm the overarching premise that “this must be done.” Of course, the summit can focus global attention and psychologically deter terrorist groups by demonstrating international resolve. However, focusing solely on the substantive content of the meetings, it is also true that the majority of issues are “self-evident principles” that could largely be derived through routine information sharing mediated by international organizations, working-level consultations between relevant ministries of each country, rather than matters requiring lengthy discussions only achievable when leaders gather in person.
Moreover, the host country preparing a summit involving over 50 nations must bear enormous manpower and financial costs. While many citizens took pride in the enhanced national prestige during the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, behind the scenes, institutions and personnel maintained high-intensity preparedness months in advance to ensure its successful execution. Summit meetings are not festive occasions like the Olympics or World Cup; rather, they demand extremely strict protocol and stringent security. Moreover, the inherent risk is enormous due to the necessity of ensuring the safety of each nation’s leaders. The very ‘existence’ of such meetings, while purporting to prevent nuclear terrorism, simultaneously provides terrorist groups with a target whose symbolic value and potential impact are maximized. In other words, there is a potential irony: a conference intended to deter terrorism paradoxically creates a situation demanding the ‘most intense counter-terrorism preparedness’. The very fact that 53 countries and 4 international organizations participated in the 2012 Seoul summit, by its sheer scale alone, heightened the density of this risk.
On another level, as the international community evolves into a complex, multi-layered structure, the number of international conferences across various fields is increasing arithmetically. Consequently, it is becoming increasingly difficult to expect that merely hosting a single conference will leave a distinct mark on the host country’s national prestige. In a situation overflowing with international conferences, their impact can easily be diluted, and this trend is likely to intensify further. Ultimately, the addition of yet another large-scale conference like the Nuclear Security Summit suggests that, from the perspective of the host country responsible for preparations, it may accumulate fatigue and financial burdens on numerous organizations and personnel, including military and police forces, while the corresponding tangible benefits or prestige may be relatively limited.
This is not to say the summits yielded no results. Rather, the summit process functioned as a mechanism, leveraging the rare ‘summit-level drive’ in the nuclear security field, to pressure nations to translate words into action. According to the 2016 White House Fact Sheet, participants in the first three summits presented over 260 national nuclear security commitments, with more than three-quarters implemented. In 2016 alone, nearly 90 additional national commitments were added (excluding the Joint Declaration and the so-called ‘Gift Basket’ initiative). In other words, the summits have not merely repeated “obvious statements,” but have elevated practical items—such as treaty ratification, research reactor and facility improvements, regulatory overhauls, technology upgrades, and training capacity building—to “political commitments,” thereby promoting a certain level of implementation. Nevertheless, whether these achievements were only possible through the direct gathering of leaders, or whether the same efficiency could have been achieved through a structure centered on permanent consultative bodies and international organizations, remains subject to critical review.
Furthermore, it can also be pointed out as problematic that large-scale international conferences like the Nuclear Security Summit are often initiated primarily to serve the needs of major powers. While the cause of nuclear security invokes the universal value of safeguarding all humanity, a closer look reveals that the security logic of major powers—nations that have experienced terrorism and remain highly vulnerable targets—inevitably dominates. The more the summit is designed to strengthen international monitoring and interdiction systems for nuclear materials, the more such systems influence not only terrorist groups but also the dynamics of power between states. Structurally, it is only natural that as the monitoring system solidifies, nations possessing greater means of information, technology, and sanctions gain an advantage. In this context, concerns that the Nuclear Security Summit could tilt toward institutionalizing the security interests of major powers under the banner of ‘nuclear security’ are by no means exaggerated.
Within this structure, the summit risks being increasingly driven by the needs of major powers. There has been repeated recognition that while major powers seek to block the circulation and import of nuclear weapons materials, they are reluctant to actively discuss reducing or eliminating their own nuclear arsenals. The deterrence provided by nuclear weapons underpins the power structures of major powers, and surveillance systems can be used not only against terrorist groups but also for mutual surveillance among states. If a global nuclear material monitoring system operates stably, major powers may, confident in their own security, begin to bring forward demands favorable to themselves one by one at the negotiating table. Moreover, since the Nuclear Security Summit centers on security cooperation regarding the overall use of nuclear materials as its core proposition, even if major powers make excessive demands, it is very difficult for other nations to withdraw from this meeting. Withdrawal carries the risk of being perceived as pursuing independent nuclear material use, and major powers could leverage this perception to condemn or pressure the opposing party. Ultimately, if the summit itself degenerates into a forum dominated by the logic of major powers, smaller nations may lack the political capacity to resist this current, potentially becoming trapped in a structure where they must passively follow.
Meanwhile, the potential impact of the Nuclear Security Summit on related industries, such as the nuclear power sector, is another matter requiring careful consideration. While the proportion of nuclear energy use varies by country, nations utilizing nuclear power generally depend on it for a significant portion of their overall energy supply. In the case of the Republic of Korea, the share of nuclear power generation was frequently cited as exceeding 30 percent around 2010, and recent statistics also show nuclear power remains one of the central pillars of Korea’s electricity mix. For example, estimates for 2024 place South Korea’s nuclear power generation share at approximately 30 percent (about 189 TWh annually), while other data released for the same year indicates nuclear power accounted for about 31.7 percent (approximately 188.8 TWh). In a country with such high dependence on nuclear power, when ‘enhancing nuclear power plant safety’ is combined with the nuclear security agenda, the policy effects are highly likely to ripple across the entire industry in the form of strengthened regulation, inspection, and oversight.
However, the nuclear industry has repeatedly experienced cycles where unexpected major accidents, like the Fukushima nuclear disaster, lead to heightened regulation and industry contraction even during normal times. Amidst this internal regulatory tightening, if international regulatory pressure through the Nuclear Security Summit is superimposed, the nuclear industry will inevitably bear additional burdens. Yet, can the nuclear industry be defined solely as a ‘burden’ that must endure excessive regulation? It is difficult to conclude that is necessarily the case. There remains room for nations to refine autonomous and stable operational systems, and the reality that a complete immediate replacement with other energy sources is difficult also strongly influences the situation. Nevertheless, if unrealistic safety measures continue to be added based solely on global accident cases, power plant operating costs will surge dramatically. In this process, operational failures stemming from the demoralized attitudes of workers and organizational rigidity within an overly regulated environment may become a more concerning risk factor than mechanical or physical defects. Therefore, it is problematic if the forum for nuclear security discussions, held every two years, evolves into a courtroom where the nuclear industry is ‘judged’ by compiling all global nuclear accidents from the previous period. If the meeting becomes one that merely churns out regulatory measures under the banner of ‘enhancing safety’ – something easily agreed upon in words – few international conferences would have a greater ripple effect on the nuclear industry.
The goals pursued by the Nuclear Security Summit are undoubtedly values that the international community must collectively uphold for the sustained prosperity and development of human civilization. However, considering the weight of a summit involving over 50 heads of state and the risks that accompany it, a reexamination is needed regarding whether the “permanent summit” format is truly optimal. Indeed, since the summit format officially concluded after 2016, the nuclear security agenda has shifted toward seeking a ‘sustainable operational model’ through institutional discussions and implementation reviews centered on the IAEA, as well as follow-up consultative bodies like the Nuclear Security Contact Group (NSCG). This suggests the international community shares this awareness to some extent. Unless an issue absolutely requires face-to-face summit-level agreement, establishing close intergovernmental cooperation and information-sharing systems to reduce summit frequency, while fulfilling commitments through regular consultations between relevant ministries and international organizations during peacetime, can reduce waste and enhance efficiency.
Furthermore, constant vigilance is needed to ensure the Nuclear Security Summit does not lose its original purpose due to the unilateral interests of major powers. Particular caution is required against regulatory functions operating excessively in a manner that stifles the entire nuclear industry under the banner of ‘nuclear security’. Strengthening nuclear security is an essential task for nuclear-using nations, but if it is designed solely to shrink the industry, it could undermine the long-term balance between energy security and industrial competitiveness. Therefore, nuclear security cooperation must focus on enhancing the physical protection of facilities and the actual capabilities for managing nuclear materials. It should be operated based on a risk-informed approach and a sophisticated assessment of feasibility, rather than accumulating unrealistic regulations that overwhelm reality.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Nuclear Security Summit created an atmosphere of global cooperation on nuclear security issues is clearly an encouraging achievement. The hundreds of national commitments and implementation records accumulated by the Summit process since 2010 can be seen as evidence that the goal of preventing nuclear terrorism can translate into actual policy and institutional changes, rather than remaining mere declarations. The potential use of nuclear weapons is no longer solely a matter for individual nations; it is a critical issue that could determine the very existence of humanity. In particular, the flow of nuclear materials into terrorist groups represents a threat humanity must confront with its very survival at stake. Consequently, the importance of international discussions on this matter should be recognized as transcending the level of the Summit itself. However, if we become overly fixated on the symbolism and illusion surrounding the Nuclear Security Summit, we risk forgetting the underlying risks. Therefore, summits should be held only when absolutely necessary and to the minimum extent possible. In normal times, a structure where the relevant ministries of each country and international organizations continuously share information and cooperate through sophisticated guidelines and practical cooperation systems is more desirable. This approach offers a realistic alternative that can naturally build an efficient nuclear security system while reducing unnecessary waste. It would also ensure that the international community’s resolve to deter nuclear terrorism is realized not through mere display, but through ‘sustainable implementation’.
