This blog post examines the asymmetry between the happiness and pain brought by childbirth from a philosophical perspective, deeply exploring how the ethical meaning differs between what exists and what does not.
Marriage often leads naturally to having children, yet children may suffer harm by being born into this world. They may contract unwanted illnesses or endure the hardships of living in a harsh world. Thus, childbirth imposes a burden on a human being without their consent. When bringing another human into existence and thereby exposing them to risk, there is a moral responsibility to have sufficient justification. Regarding whether childbirth is ethical, some argue that having children is necessary because of the joy of raising them and the expectation that they will live happily. Conversely, others argue that having children should be avoided because raising them is painful and it seems unlikely the child will live happily in this world. However, since this depends on individual subjective judgment, one cannot claim that either having children or not having children is better based on such grounds. Philosopher David Benatar presents an argument that, instead of relying on this experiential approach, uses a logical analysis showing that pleasure and pain are not symmetrical to argue that not being born is better.
Benatar’s argument is based on the following idea: While good things in a person’s life enrich that life compared to one without them, if a person never existed, they would lose nothing by not existing. This is because there is no one to lose anything in the first place. However, by coming into existence, that person suffers serious harm that would not have occurred had they not existed. Those who wish to oppose this argument might point out that the benefits enjoyed by the wealthy and privileged outweigh the harms they might suffer. But Benatar’s counterargument relies on the claim that there is an asymmetry between the absence of good and the absence of evil. The absence of something bad, like pain, is considered good even if there is no one to actually experience it. Conversely, the absence of something good, like pleasure, is only evaluated as bad when there is someone who stands to lose that good. This logic holds that since pain does not exist when one does not exist, it constitutes good, and even if pleasure does not exist, there is no reason to condemn its absence. Conversely, when one does exist, the presence of pain is evaluated as bad, and the presence of pleasure is evaluated as good. Based on this framework, Benata emphasizes that the absence of pain is a clear benefit when it does not exist, whereas the absence of pleasure is never a loss. He ultimately concludes that non-existence is better than existence.
To refute Benata’s argument, one must critique his core premise that there is asymmetry between the absence of good and the absence of evil. For the first critique, imagine a country with ten million inhabitants. Five million endure constant suffering, while another five million enjoy happiness. An angel, witnessing this, appeals to God, pleading that the suffering of five million is excessively harsh and demanding action. God agrees, reversing time to recreate the world so that the five million who were unhappy never suffered. Yet, according to Benatar’s logic, God could have reversed time to prevent the existence of this country of ten million altogether. Yet if God had accepted the angel’s plea in this manner, not only the angel but most people would be horrified. This thought experiment demonstrates, contrary to Benata’s claim, that the absence of good is not merely neutral but can be actively harmful—that is, eliminating lives is too great a price to pay for removing suffering.
The first critique accepted Benata’s premise that the absence of bad things or the absence of good things can possess positive or negative value even in the absence of a subject to experience that absence. The second critique, however, challenges that premise itself. Terms of evaluation only have meaning when they refer, even indirectly, to people. Therefore, claiming that the absence of good or bad things has meaning independent of any subject to experience that absence is meaningless and undesirable. In Benatar’s theory, the expression “absence of evil” can never have a subject. In the context of non-existence, there can be no individual to avoid the bad.
If Benatar’s claim is correct, then birth can never be good, and moral reflection on birth must necessarily lead to the abandonment of birth. And we would have no need to be grateful to the parents who brought us into this world. Therefore, the justification for his claim must be critically discussed, and philosophical reflection on existence and birth must continue even today.
