This blog post examines how the new warfare, brought about by globalization and the rise of non-state actors, is shaking the framework of nation-state-based democracy and what kind of shift it demands.
Modern democracy has developed within the political community of the nation-state, centered on nationalism, national identity, and the citizenship rights that accompany nationality. However, recent globalization is bringing significant changes to the order of democracy and international relations based on the nation-state. Amidst these changes, so-called ‘new wars’ with different characteristics from those of the nation-state era are emerging, and these wars are shaking the existing order of the nation-state.
Above all, the new war reveals the characteristic of blurred boundaries. Unlike the nation-state era, where wars occurred between states and peace was established through international legal procedures after the war ended, today’s wars often unfold without distinction between front and rear, erasing the boundaries between combatants and civilians, public and private spheres, and where even the beginning and end of the war are often unclear. Furthermore, private military companies, which perform the role of mercenaries in modern society, provide virtually all military services, from training to post-war operations.
Additionally, wars now erupt due to diverse causes beyond political or ideological conflicts. In Eastern Europe, following the collapse of the socialist system, issues of religion, language, script, and ethnicity have resurfaced. In the Middle East, religious conflicts are causing complex problems. In Africa, factors such as tribal conflicts, colonial-era border demarcations, the fragile state systems of newly independent nations, and resource issues intertwine to create complex triggers for war.
Moreover, diverse forms of warfare are emerging, including network warfare, asymmetric warfare, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism. Network warfare relies heavily on horizontal coordination mechanisms driven by shared values or goals rather than bureaucratic command structures, while guerrilla warfare unfolds based on sophisticated organization despite unclear front lines. A prime example is the situation during the first Gulf War in the early 1990s: despite the U.S. attack crippling the Iraqi government’s command and control system within hours, the Iraqi military itself was unable to determine the location of coalition forces. This starkly illustrates one facet of the new warfare.
The war economy also reveals new characteristics. In new warfare, funding is secured not only through the official economy operating under state control and state revenues via taxation, but also through the utilization of the informal economy. When the production base collapses and tax collection becomes practically impossible, combat groups secure war funds by mobilizing looting and kidnapping, illegal trade in weapons, drugs, and resources, remittances from emigrants, a form of ‘taxation’ on humanitarian aid, and sponsorship from foreign governments.
Meanwhile, there is also criticism that many phenomena presented as ‘new’ in these new wars actually existed in previous wars but simply did not receive sufficient attention. Critics point out that the new war theory overly emphasizes certain phenomena and that the increased visibility of various aspects of war is merely a result of media development. They further criticize studies advocating for new warfare for selectively choosing favorable cases amidst unclear empirical data and insufficient material, arguing that civil wars have generally decreased since 1992 and that the extent of ‘new’ phenomena is statistically insignificant when compared to World War II.
Nevertheless, the concept of ‘new warfare’ provides important insights for understanding new threats and recent changes in international politics. This is because new warfare tends to disintegrate rather than form states. Consider Somalia, often cited as a prime example of a ‘failed state’ due to war. Contrary to fears, the collapse of the state did not lead to widespread chaos; instead, there were signs of improvement in certain aspects of people’s lives. This is because international cooperation and traditional economies, rather than the state, are responsible for providing public goods, while customary law and tribal networks contribute to maintaining social order. Furthermore, in the Middle East, elements like religion or tribe are emerging as new forms of nationalism, suggesting that nationalism does not necessarily require a state to function.
From this perspective, the nation-state is merely a Eurocentric model formed during a specific historical period. Historical experience demonstrates that diverse political entities can coexist. The frequent new wars in Africa and the Middle East seem to be reverting the world to a state resembling pre-modern Europe, where chaotic coexistence of various political communities like city-states, nations, and empires prevailed.
However, this trend simultaneously presents an opportunity to materialize diverse possibilities for new communities. Democracy must evolve not by reinforcing the nation-state, as far-right nationalism does, but by transcending the limitations and frameworks of the nation-state, crossing them over. The multi-layered space formed by global cities and their networks, where world citizens with multiple identities coexist on the basis of equal citizenship, and by supranational communities like the EU, can become another arena for democracy. The democracy achieved in the era of nation-states must now be preserved within new communities while undergoing transformation, and it must expand further within these new citizens and the communities they create.
