This blog post calmly examines the insights Otto Hösle’s tripartite division of objectivity, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity provides into the structure and argumentation methods of philosophical writing.
The definition of philosophical writing methods is directly linked to how we define the academic nature of philosophy. Unlike empirical sciences, where validity is determined through empirical data on phenomena, philosophy seeks to explore meta-principles beyond phenomena. Simultaneously, as an academic discipline, philosophy can never escape the duty of justification and must exist not as mere assertion but as rigorous argumentation. Therefore, whether a text can be described as ‘philosophical’ depends on whether its mode of presentation satisfies these conditions. Ultimately, how the form of philosophical writing is structured is not merely a matter of personal taste, but a complex issue directly linked to how much that form can enhance the academic health of philosophy.
In this regard, Otto Hösle’s theory of philosophical genres draws particular attention. His theory unfolds around the categories of ‘objectivity,’ ‘subjectivity,‘ and ‘intersubjectivity,’ a tripartite division with its own rationale. Primarily, these three categories respectively encompass the realms of existence, cognition, and communication, which together signify the entirety of philosophical subject matter. In other words, no matter what stance an individual author takes or what topic they focus on, philosophical statements ultimately fall into at least one of three categories: statements about an objective object, statements about the subject confronting that object, or statements about the relationship between subjects. Furthermore, these categories are also useful for typologically classifying the forms of philosophical writing. That is, philosophical statements can unfold by directly addressing the subject of the problem, by describing the author’s internal flow of thought concerning the subject, or by directly confronting various claims surrounding the problem. Otto Hösle names these three forms respectively the ‘genre of objectivity’, the ‘genre of subjectivity’, and the ‘genre of intersubjectivity’. Of course, the three categories and three forms do not correspond one-to-one; a subject belonging to one category can be described using the writing style of another category.
First, in the genre of objectivity, the subject primarily appears as the subject of the sentence. Even if the author’s personality is revealed stylistically, the author as an individual does not appear directly in the text. For instance, Hegel never speaks about himself in his ‘Logic’; this work consists solely of descriptions of the logical definitions of concepts and the transitional relationships between them. This is a device to ensure the progression of statements is not dictated by the author’s arbitrary construction but by the logic of the subject itself. Conversely, in the genre of subjectivity, the author’s personal thought process or that related to the subject is directly revealed. A prime example is Descartes’ ‘Meditations,’ where most sentences are constructed using first-person singular verbs or pronouns. This approach guides readers to vividly trace and verify the author’s thought process. Finally, dialogues like Plato’s Republic are paradigmatic of the intersubjective genre. Here, not only the author but also others explicitly appear as speakers, and sometimes the author himself appears in the form of another person. This not only presents arguments more vividly but also naturally reveals the antagonistic and sympathetic relationships between them.
Otto Hösle’s particular focus on the dialogic genre stems from the exceptional status he assigns to the category of intersubjectivity. Philosophical themes do not reveal themselves independently; they are brought to the surface as subjects only through the author’s act of speaking. Moreover, the author’s act of speaking presupposes the existence of a reader who has already read and understood the text, posing questions or raising counterarguments. In other words, objectivity requires subjectivity, and subjectivity only acquires meaning through its relationship with another subjectivity; thus, the two categories ultimately converge into intersubjectivity. Setting aside this fundamental aspect, dialogues also have the advantage of partially resolving the structural problem that philosophy’s original conundrums—problems at the meta-level—are difficult to construct as justified arguments. This is because for the author’s argument to be persuasive, it must withstand anticipated counterarguments. In dialogues, participants representing diverse viewpoints—not only those advocating the author’s position but also those raising opposing arguments—appear as equal debaters. Through the ongoing process of contesting these counterarguments with his own rebuttals, the author can build a more robust justification for his claims.
Today, dialogues are rarely written in philosophy. Otto Hösle, who champions the value of intersubjectivity, must find this situation regrettable. This stems from the common conviction among many philosophers that the rigor of argumentation—the lifeblood of philosophical texts—is better achieved within the genre of objectivity, which centers on ‘the subject itself’. However, considering that dialogues may sometimes be more advantageous in terms of the breadth of argumentation and immunity to potential counterarguments, Otto Hösle’s regret regarding the current near-disappearance of this genre is entirely understandable.
